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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD F. CORAY;Ancilliary Administrator of the Estate of V\Tilliam Frank Lucus, Deceased, .

~

.

~.

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. ·
7382

vs.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY,a corporation,
·

=.:.~

:- ,: .

D.efendan.t and Re_spon.dent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The first trial of this case resulted in a directed
verdict for ·defen.dant, which was affirmed by .the Supreme court of Utah, and reversed by the Supreme Court
of the United States. That court held the question of
whether the death of Lucus was caused in whole or in
part by the failure of the triple valve on the air line
was a jury question. The second trial was, before a jury
which returned a verdict of no cause of action.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant did not contend in the trial court that he
was entitled to a directed verdict. He ·does not contend
in this court that there is no testimony to support the
verdict. The contention of Appellant's brief is there
was error below in the instructions and failure to instruct, and in the introduction of evidence. Mr. Lucus,
the deceased, was traveling east on a motor track car
which he was operating and looking west when he ran
into the rear end of a freight train which had stopped
on the track. He was killed. The train had stopped
because a nut on a valve in the air line had become disconnected. This caused the brakes on all the cars of
the train to be applied, and stopped the train just the
same as if the engineer had applied the brakes in emergency or full application. The train ran between thirty
~)and forty car lengths before stopping after the brakes
were applied. This would be from 1500 to 2000 feet.
(Tr. 71). The brakes on the track ·car were in good condition, and would stop the car- in 100 feet going thirtyfive miles an hour. (Tr. 138). The deceased Lucus was
going to deliver some pay checks to railroad employees
who lived at various stations east of Lemay, the point
where he placed the car on the track. Alvin Lynch another employee was going to relieve· Lucus as signal
maintainer a.t Lemay, and he was ridin·g on the car at ihe
time of the accident to become familiar with the territory.
Lucus had no duties to _perform except to operate the
motor car. Lucus and Lynch were not talking to each
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other. As the n1otor car approached the stopped train,
it was going fron1 ten to twenty-five miles an hour. (Tr.
22). It is undisputed that Lucus did not apply the
brakea of the track car prior to the collision. Lucus
and Lynch both kne'v the freight train was only three
or four hundred yards ahead of them on the track. (Tr.
19).
They placed the track car on the main track after
waiting for the eastbound freight train to pull out
ahead of the1n. The car was built for one man operation
and Mr. Lucus was the operator. (Tr. 20).
The suit was brought on behalf of the widow of
Frank Lucus, who was about ten years ol~er,~,_than he.
There were no children. Mr. Lucus brought a suit
against Mrs. Lucus for divorce in Los Angeles, California, where the parties were then living, in August,
1942. Mrs. Lucus filed a cross-complaint for separate
maintenance. A photostatic copy of her Cross-complaint
is in the record as defendant's Exhibit 2. The court
made an order on January 6, 1943, allowing Mrs. Lucus
$10.00 a week as .support money. Mrs. Lucus never
saw or heard from him again during his life. He waf?
killed in May, 1944, in western Utah. He never paid
anything on the support money. FUrther facts in regard
to defendant's claim that Mrs. Lucus lost nothing by
the death of her husband are stated in ·connection with
the argument on that point.
Because appellant claims there was reversible error
In the instructions, it is important to learn what. the
court told the jury.
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Instruction No. 2 told the jury that the defendant
was operating a freight train containing a defective
car in that the triple union nut became disconnected
and allowed the air pressure to escape and set the
brakes and forced the train to come to an abrupt and
sudden stop. That William Frank Lucus, who was following the train on a motor car, did not observe the
freight train had stopped, and as a result the motor
car crashed into the rear end of the freight train, and
Lucus received fatal injures from which he died. The
court told the jury that the defendant claims the negligence of Lucus was ''the sole proximate cause'' of his
'death.
In Instruction No. 5 the court told the jury that,
''The defendant was guilty of a violation of
the Federal Safety Appliance Act, and if you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that
such violation proximately caused, in whole or
in p·art, the death of William .Frank Lucus, then
you should return a verdict' in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and award to
plaintiff damages as in these instructions set
forth.
"You are instructed that under the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act if
a violation of such a:ct by a common carrier by
rail in inter-state commerce contributes to the
death of one of its employees then such employee
cwnno·t be held to have been guilty ·Of cDntributory
negligence.''
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The last paragraph of the foregoing Instruction
No. 5 is a.n exact copy of the first paragraph of appellant's requested Instruction No. 4. The first paragraph of the foregoing Instruction No. 5 is a copy of
a portion of the last paragraph of appellant's requested
Instruction No. 3. ( Tr. 208).
The jury \Yas instructed that the parties to the action
were engaged in interstate commerce, and plaintiff's
right to recover based on the federal statutes .and the
statutes of Utah relating to Workmen's Compensation
do not apply.
The appellant's requested Instruction No. 10 (Tr.
208) asked for the usual and standard instruction on
the measure of damages which Mrs. Lucus sustained
as a result of the death of her husband. That request
was given ·as Instruction No. 11.
Appellant assigns as error the refusal of the court
to give his requested Instruction No. 11, which reads
as follows:
"You are instructed that the marriage relation creates a right on the part of the wife
to be supported by her husband and this right
may he legally enforced by her so long as the
marriage relation exists, and if the said Edith
B. Lucus is entitled to recover damages under
these instructions she cannot be dep:rived of
that right by a :plea on the part of defendant that
her husband had not fulfilled the duties he owed
to her.
''In this connection you are instructed that ·
if you find that plaintiff is entitled to recover
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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da1nages in this case then in deter1nining the
loss of pecuniary benefits mentioned in Instruction No·------------· (Here insert the number of the
Court's instruction which corresponds with plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 10.) You may
take into consideration not only such voluntary
contributions as 'Villiam Frank Lucus may rea. .
sonably have been exp~ected to make to Edith B.
Lucus during her lifetime but also such contributions as she may reasonably have been expected
to secure through the enforcement of her legal
right to support from her husband."
Appellant objects to the giving of Instruction No.
9, which reads as follows:
''You are instructed that the mere fact that
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank Lucus
at the time of his death is not sufficient evidence
to prove that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
any damages for his death in this action. If
you believe from all the evidence in the case
that the deceased would not have made any further money contributions to Edith Lucus or
would not have supported her in the future if
he had not died, then your vetdict should be for
the defendant.''
ARGUMENT
A. THE TRIAL . COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENICE WAB. A DEFENSE AND PROPERLY SU·BMIT·TE·D THE ISSUE OF
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE.

At p·age 39 of ap·pellant 's brief, it is said:
''The contention of defendant that an issue
of sole proximate cause is made is pure and
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sin1ple subterfuge and n1ade for the purpose of
breathing life into a defense which has been expressly elinrinated not only by the Federal Congress but the :Supreme Court of the United States
in thi~ very case.''
Let us pause at the outset to ask, if there 'vas no
issue of sole proximate cause in the case, what was the
issue for the jury¥ There was no dispute that the train
stopped, because of a failure of the air line which caused
an emergency stop. Appellant requested the court to
submit to the jury th·e issue of sole proximate cause in
his request No. 3. The issue there requested by appel-_
lant is that if the stopping of the train ''proximately
caused in whole or in part'' the death of Lucus, then
· · the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff. One may
not object on appeal to a ruling of the trial court that
was invited by the appellant.

In his summary of the Argument appellant at page
6 of the brief states :
''The court prejudicially instructed the jury
that if deceased was guilty of contributory negligence his negligence was a complete bar to recovery." (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, and 3).
This assertion is not supported by the record. In
Instruction No. 16 the jury was told that if Lucus chose
an unsafe position on the motor car when a safe position was equally available to him, he was negligent
and if such negligence was the ''sole proximate cause''
of deceased's injuries, then the verdict should be for
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defendant. That instruction further told the jury that
the burden was on defendant to prove that the negligence
of Lucus, if any, was the sole proximate cause of his
death. To attempt to say this instruction told the jury
that if deceased was guilty of eontributory negligence,
his contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery is a bald misconstruction of the language used.
To show further how far apellant has departed
from the facts of the record in this regard, it is neces·sary to refer to the last paragraph of Instruction No.
5 which we again quote:
"You are instructed that under the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act if a
violation of such act by a common carrier by
rail in inter-state commerce contributes to the
death of one of its employees then such employee
cannot he held to have been guilty of contributory
negligence.''
·
The court in Instruction No. 5 as requested in appellant's request No. 3 instructed the jury that defendant
was guilty of a violation of the federal law and also that
if a violation of such act contributes to the death of one
of its employees then such employee ''cannot be held
to have been guilty of contributory negligence.'' The
instruction was the verbatim product of appellant's
request designed and worded and intended to make it
clear to the jury that contributory negligence was no
defense. But in spite of the fact that the court told the
jury as requested by a.pp,ellant that contributory negligence was no defense, we find appellant's brief in the
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su1nn1ary erroneously telling this court that the trial
court instructed the jury that contributory negligence
'' "yas a complete bar to recovery.'' Even without the
aid of the 'vell-kno"yn rule that the instructions must be
considered together, there is no basis in fact for the
assertion of the sun1mary.
The cases fron1 the Supren1e Court of the United
States relied on by appellant do not hold there was
any error in the instructions to the jury or in the admission of evidence in the Coray case.
Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Lilndsay, 233 U.S.
42, 58 L. Ed. 838 (1914), the plaintiff below obtained a
verdict in the trial court which was affirmed in the
Seventh Circuit Court of appeals, and also in the Supreme Court. The Railway Company moved for a directed verdict which was denied and it appealed in both
upper courts. The assignment of error considered by
the Supreme Court was the refu8al to direct the ver-

dict for defendant below. It appeared that Lindsay was
hurt while trying to couple two cars, one of which had
a defective coupler. The trial court had told the jury
that if Lindsay had done something carelessly which
had proximately contributed to the accident., he could
not recover. The Supreme Court quotes with approval
from the decision of the Circuit Court that,
"It is only when plaintiff's act is the sole
cause- when defendant's act is no part of the
causation - that defendant is free from liability under the act.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We submit that in the Co ray case the jury was not
instructed that contributory negligence was a defense.
They were told directly to the contrary. In the Lindsay
ca.se the jury had found that the negligence of the railroad in having the defective car in use was one of the
causes of the accident. The jury in the Coray case found
that the negligence of the railroad in having the defective
air line in the train was not one of the causes of the
accident.
The jury in the Coray case was not told that contributory negligence was a complete or any defense.
Spokane & lnl;a.nd EmpiJre Railroad Co. v. CampbeU,
241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125, the plaintiff
below (Camp·bell) obtained a verdict which was affirmed on appeal. The ;Supreme Court held the jury
must have found that the defective air brakes were ''a
proximate cause of the collisi,on. '' The employee had
left Coeur d'Alene westbound in violation of his orders.
He collided with a train on the same track moving easthound. There was evidence that he saw the approaching
train, and if the air brake·s had worked, he could have
stopped his train in time to have avoided the collision.
The court held that where "plaintiff's contributory negligence and the defendant's violation of a provision of the
Safety Appliance Act are concurring proximate causes,
it is plain that the Employer's Liability Act requires
the former to be disregarded.''

The rule of the. Campbell case was apparently embodied in ap·pellant's request No. 4, and was given in
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Instruction No. 5 in 'vhich the jury was told that if a
violation of the Safety .i\ppliance Law contributes to the
death, then the employee cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence. We are unable to see anything
in the Can1pbell case which shows error in th·e instruction in the Coray case. The jury in the Campbell case
held for the plaintiff, and the jury in the Coray case
held for the defendant. The instructions of the trial
court in the latter case do not conflict with the law of the
Campbell case. The defendant's contention in the Campbell case to which the Supreme Court devoted its attention was that it was entitled to judgment not withstanding the general verdict for Campbell. The jury found
specially that the violation of his orders by Campbell
when he left Coeur d'Alene was the proximate cause of
the accident, but also returned a general verdict for the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court said ''the jury must have
found that the defective air brakes were a proximate
cause of the collision.'' The jury in the Co ray case
must have found that the failure of the air line on the
train did not cause ''in whole or in pa~t '' the death of
Lucus. The rule of law announced in the Campbell case
was correctly embodied in the instructions to the jury
in the Coray case.

Chicago Gre~at Western Railroad Company v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 45 S. Ct. 303, 69 L. E·d. 614. The employee was killed while working on a car with a defective ·drawbar. He was between two cars to disengage a
connecting chain used becaus-e of the defective drawbar.
The engineer was not told he had gone between the cars.
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The engine was disconnected and the car adjacent to
the en1ployee moved and caused his death. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant contended that the car had come to rest on the sidetrack and
had ceased to be "used" as contemplated by the act.
The court ·held the use of the ·defective car had not
ended. No instruction to the jury is discussed. It is
significant that the trial court permitted the defendant
to prove the violation of the safety rule, which provided
that employees should advise the engineer when they
were going between or under cars. Appellant presumably relies upon the Schendel case to show that the contributory negligence of the employee did not prevent the
case from going to the jury. Neither did contributory
negligence prevent the Coray case from going to the
jury. The jury was told the plaintiff could not be held
to have been _guilty of ·contributory negligence if a
violation of the act contributes to the death. The jury
found, by its general verdict for defendant, that the violation of the act did not contribute to the death.

Scrimo v. Central R.R. of New Jersey, et al, 138
F. (2d) 761. In the Scrimo case the court below admitted in evidence the safety rules of the company just
as they were admitted in the Coray case. The deceased
was engaged in a switching operation and was found
dead under the wheels of a car on which there was a
defective coupling device, warranting the inference that
deceased stumbled when attempting to ji_ggle the lock
pin of the defective coupling. The rule that contributory
negligence is not a defense if violation of th·e Safety
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~\ppliance ..~.\ct

contributes to the death stated in the
Scrin1o case is the rule which the court gave~ in its instructions in the Coray case.
Palzon L". Lehigh Valley R. Co., 165 F. (2d) 3. Here
the plaintiff employee obtained a verdict which was
affirmed on appeal. He was a fireman hit by a low
bridge \vhile going on top of the tender to measure the
water. The court held that the question of whether
the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cauae of his injuries was a jury question. There was e·nough evidence
of negligence of the defendant in using the fireman on a
part of the line he had never been over before to support
submission to the jury under the ''recent decisions''
of the Supreme Court of the United States. We find
difficulty in seeing the relevancy of this Palum case to
the case at bar. No que-ation of the propriety of instructions was involved. If the trial court in the Coray case
had granted a directed verdict for the defendant as in
the prior trial, the Palum case is authority for the contention that it should goi to the jury.
The Palum case contains the following discussion
of the case of Willis v. Pernn. R. Co., 122 F.(2d) 248,
(Certiorari denied 314, U.S. 684, 62 S. Ct. 187, 86 L. Ed.
547.).
''The defendant argues that the decision
of this court in Willis v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
should have controlled the trial judge in the case
at bar and that it required the direction of a
verdict for the defendant on the ground that
plantiff's conduct in leaving the cab in disregard
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of the rule and failing to observe the low bridge
in time to prevent being hit was the sole cause of
his injury. But Willis v. Pennsylvania R. Co. may
be distinguished on the ground that the only
duty of the plaintiff there was to 'vatch and if he
had watched the injury to him would not have
happened. Here a duty of the plaintiff was to
see that there was sufficient water in the boiler
and it was in attending to the performance of that
very duty, albeit with negligence in one aspect
thereof, that he sustained the injury. It is not
certain that if he had notified the engineer that
he was going to leave the cab in order to sound
the ta.nk that he would have been warned against
the low bridge for it is entirely possible that the
engineer would have expected him to look out
for himself and to watch for such a danger as
he encountered. What the plaintiff seems to have
done was to have failed to he watchful enough
for obstacles as well as to have forgotten to notify
the engineer that he was going to leave the cab.
We think the inadvertent neglect to observe the
rule, while probably an act of contributory negligence to be considered by the jury in reduction
of his damages, was not a bar to his claim.''
We believe the Palum case shows there was a question of sole proximate cause in the Coray case, because
it is undisputed from the record that Lucus like Willis
had no duty other than to watch as he rode along the
track on the motor car. He was going to deliver pay
checks to emp loyees east of Lemay.
1

In the Willis case (supra.) three ·signal maintainers
were working on a switch in the classification yard.
There was a long standing custom, with which all em1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
ployees 'vere familiar, for switching to be continued
'vhile track repair w·ork \Yas being performed and for
the repair gang to protect themselves by having one of
their number act as lookout and give warning of approaching cars. Willis was acting as lookout when a
moving car hit and killed him. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Willi.s' neglect
of his duty to act as watchman was the ''sole cause''
of his ovvn death, and that even since the recent amendment of 45 U.S.C.A. Section 54 excluding assumption of
risk as a defense, an employee cannot recover for injuries resulting solely from his own fault. The Willis
case held the trial court properly directed the verdict
for the defendant.
If the question of ''.sole cause'' in the Willis case
was one of law, it is obvious that the question of "sole
cause'' in the Coray case was one of fact in view of
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United -States.
In fact, that is what the U.S. Court held as shown by
the Quotation from the opinion in appellant's brief at
page 25. The last sentence reads :
''The jury could, have found that decendent 's
death r-esulted from any or all of the foregoing
circumstances.''
This means the ~s.uJJireme Court held there was a jury
question of causation. The jury in the case, under p-roper instructions, held the death resulted solely from the
negligence of Lucus.
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The Supreme Court in Johanna Frese, admx. v.
Chicago Bu.rlington ·wnd Qu.incy Railroad Compan;y, 68
L. Ed. 131, 263 U.S. 1, held plaintiff could not recover
for an injury due ''primarily'' to the failure of the deceased to act. Frese was the ·engineer on a Burlington
train which collided with a Wabash train at a crossing
of the tracks on the same level. A statute of Illinois
made it the duty of the engineer to stop within 800 feet
and positively ascertain that the way is clear. The
Wabash train. was approaching, (after both trains had
stopped for the crossing) from the Burlington fireman's
side of the ·engine and the plaintiff alleged negligence of
the fireman. The court pointed out the statute made it
the personal duty of the engineer to ascertain that it
was safe to re·sume the course.

"* * • Moreover, the statute makes it the
personal duty of the engineer positively to ascertain that the train can safely resume its course.
Whatever may have been the practice, he could
not escape this duty, and it would be a perversion of the Employer's Liability Act (April 22,
1908, chap. 149, Sec. 3, 35 Stat. at L. 65, 66, Comp.
:Stat. Sec. 8659, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1339)
to hold that he could recover for an injury primarily due to his failure to act as required on
the ground that possibly the injury might have
been prevented if his subordinate had done more.
See Great North'ern R. Co. v. Wiles, 240 (4) U.S.
444, 448. 60 L. Ed. 732, 734, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep.
406. * * *"
While that case did not involve a violation of the
Safety Appliance Act, the legal principle holding it was
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proper to direct a verdict below for the defendant on
the ground the negligence of the engineer was the sole
proxilnate cause of his death clearly proves it was proper for the court in the Coray case to submit the issue of
causation to the jury.
In . .-!·nna La,ng, adntx. r. New York Central Railroad
Conz.pany, 65 L. Ed. 729, 255 U.S. 455, the action was
lmder the Safety ..A.ppliance Act. The defendant had a
defective car loaded with iron on the siding a:t the station in Silver Creek, New York. The drawbar, the draft
timber, and the coupling apparatus on the westerly end
of this car were gone. This condition was known to the
plaintiff's intestate prior to the accident. During a
switching movement involving connecting three cars on
the track where the crip·pled car stood, plaintiff'.s intestate was on one of these three cars for the pur·pose of
setting the brakes and so placing them on this siding as
not to come into contact with the crippled car. He
went to the east end of the easterly car (on top) an,d
his foot was resting on a small p1atform at the end of the
car which is below the brake wheel. For ·.some reason
he did not stop the three cars moving on this track
before coming into contact with the crip~pled car. The
cars collided and owing to the absence of coupler attached on the crippled car, intestate's leg was caught
between the ends of the two cars and he was so injured
that he died. It was not the intention of any of the crev.r
to disturb or couple or to move the crippled car. The
defendant railroad contended and the Court held, that
the proximate cause of the accident was the failure of the
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deceased to stop the cars before they came into collision
with the defective car, and that the absence of the
coupler and drawbar was not a proximate cause or a
concurring cans~.
"It was the duty of the crew, we repeat, and
immediately the duty of Lang, to stop the colliding car, and to set the brakes upon it 'so as
not to come into contact with the crippled car,'
to quote again from the trial court. That duty
he failed to perform, and if it may be said that
notwithstanding he would not have been injured
if the car collided with had been equipped with
drawbar and coupler, we answer, as the court of
appeals answered: 'Still the collision was not the
proximate result of the defect.' Or, in other
words, and as expressed in effect in the Conarty
Case, that the collision under the evidence cannot be attributable to a violation of the provisions
of the law, 'but only had they been complied
with, it (the collision) would not have resulted in
the injury to the deceased.' "
In St. Louis & San Fr·ancisco Railroad Compainy v.
Farl!liie M. Conarty, admx., 59 L. Ed. 1290, 238 U.S. 242,
it ap·peared that the deceased was killed in a collision
between a switch engine and a loaded freight car having no coupling or drawbar at one end, these having been
pulled out while the car was in transit. The car was
about to be placed on an isolated track for repair. The
deceased and two companions were ·standing on the
foot board on the front of the switch engine, and when
the car was observed, his com:p·anions stepped to the
ground on either side of the track, while he remained
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on the footboard and was caught between the engine and
the car at the end fro1n 'vhich the coupler and drawbar
w. as missing. These appliances had they been in plac.e
would have kept the engine and the body of the car
sufficiently apart to have prevented the injury. The deceased and his companions were not intending to and did
not attempt to couple the defective car to the engine
or handle it in any way. The court said that the principal question in the case was whether at the time he was
injured the deceased was within the class of persons for
whose benefit the Safety Appliance Act required automatic couplers and drawbars. The court points out that
the purpose of the act relating to drawbars and automatic couplers is to enable the car to be coupled or uncoupled ''without the necessity of men going between the
ends of the cars."

'' * * * Nothing in either provision gives any
warrant for saying that they are intended to
provide a place of safety between colliding cars.
On the contrary, they affirmatively show that a
principal purpose in their enactment was to obviate 'the necessity for men going between the
ends of the cars. '
''We are of the opinion that the deceased,
who was not (251) endeavoring to couple or
uncouple the car or to handle it in any way, but
was riding on the colliding engine, was not in
a situation where the absence of the prescribed
coupler and drawbar operated as a breach of a
duty imposed for his benefit, and that the :Supreme Court of the state erred in concluding that
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the safety appliance acts required it to hold otherwise.''
The Lang and Conarty cases arose under the Safety
Appliance Act. They held the question of causation was
one of law for the Court and resolved the question
against the plaintiffs. It is the law of the Coray case
that the question of causation is for the jury. Each of
these cases supports our claim that the instructions of
the trial court on causation were correct.
In St. Louis, Iron Mou.ntain & Souther,n Railway v.
McWhirter, 57 L. Ed. 1179, 229 U.S. 265, 33 S. Ct. 858,
the deceased employee was killed by a slowly moving
engine from which he dismounted to run ahead along
the track to open th·e switch. He fell on the track. The
accident happ,ened five minutes after the sixteen hours
which employees are permitted to work under federal
law had expired. The court of appeal·s held that the
death of deceased must in part be attributed to the violation of the hours of service! act. 'The ·SupTeme Court
of the United States reverse·d the
was no proof of proximate cause :

~as·e

and held there

J

'' . . . It requires no reasoning to demonstrate that the general rule is· that, where negligence is charged, to justify a recovery it must 'be
shown that the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. The character of evidence necessary to prove such causation we need
not point out, as it must depend upon the circumstances of each case. . . . ''
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B. THE RULES OF DEFENDANT RELATING TO THE
OPERATION OF TR ..\CI{ CARS WERE PROPERLY ADlVIITTED IN EVIDEN'CE UPON THE ISSUE OF SOLE PROXI~\LATE CA.USE .

. .\.ppella.nt assigns error upon the ruling of the court
permitting the defendant below to introduce in evidence the rules of the railroad company relating to the
operation of track cars. These rules are numbered 1112
to 1119, a.nd 1120, and are found at page 136 of the
transcript of the testimony. Rule 1112, provides that
track cars \Yhen following a moving train ·shall remain
not less than 400 feet to the rear of the same, and shall
not stop within 200 feet of standing trains. Rule 1119,
provides that track cars shall not be operated at a
speed in excess of 15 m.p.h. Rule 1120, provides that
operators of track cars must bear in mind that ap~proach
ing trains may immediately enter a block even though
that block is not occupied at the time, and that lineups
obtained from train dispatchers cannot always be· depended upon by reason of conditions unexpectedly changIng.
The appellant tried the .case below on the theory
that the i.ssue in the case upon the question of lia-.
bility was one of sole proximate cause. That is the
rule announced by the cases. All that the Supreme
Court of the United States did in its decision in the Coray
case was to put the question of proximate cause in the
hands of the jury, an~d held that the trial court in the
first trial was in error when it directed the verdict, and
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ther than one of fact. \\T e refer again to the language
of that court in which it said:
"The jury could have found that decedent's
death resulted fron1 any or all of the foregoing
cirrun1~tance~. ''
It perhaps would not be useful to devote space to
general definitions of the rule of proximate cause. As
shown by the cases from the Supreme Court of the
United States, in order for an act to be the proximate
cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury wa.s
a natural and probable consequence of the negligence or
wrongful act, and it ought to have been foreseen in the
light ~of ~a.ttending circumstances. This is the rnle which
is quoted with ap1proval by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Brady vs. S'outhern Railway Compam;y,
320 U. S. 476, 88 L. Ed. 239. The rule is quoted from an
earlier case of Milw,aukee & St. P.R. Co. vs. Kellogg, 94
U. S. 469, at 475, 24 L. Ed. 25;6, at 259:
''But it is generally held, that, in order to
warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not
amounting to wanton wrong, is the proximate
cause of an injury, it must ap·pear that the injury
was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to
have been foreseen in the light of the attending
circumstances.
''Events too remote to require reasonable
·pre-vision need not be anticipated .... "
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It is obvious that the rules of the co1npany relating
to speed of track ears and the distance they must remain
behind moving trains are facts which the jury is entitled to consider in detern1ining whether the running
into the rear end of the stopped train "\Vas so unusual and
s-o contrary to the results which would norm·ally and
naturally follow from an emergency stop of a train when
the airline became disconnected that the stop·ping was
not the proximate cause of the death of Mr. Lucus. If
·such testimony is not admissible to prove that the death
of Lucus was not an event reasonably to be foreseen
or anticipated because the train stop·p·ed on the track,
it would likewise appear that all testimony with respect to the facts relating to the accident itself would
be immaterial. Certainly, there is equal reason for the
court to hold tha~ the jury was entitled to have before
them the rules of the company relating to the operation of track cars, as they were entitle·d to the testimony
of the train crew respecting the ·o·p,eed at which the
track car was moving, or the testimony of Mr. Lynch
who was riding on the track car relating to all of the
events which he described. That testimony was introduced by the plaintiff. These rules were not introducedfor the purpose of showing contributory ne_gligence
or concurring negligence of Lucus, but to support an
inference by the jury that the conduct of Lucus in running into the rear end of the train in broad daylight on
a straight track was the sole proximate cause of his .
death. The rules themselves merely state the human law
of self-preservation. The jury was told specifically that
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in this case contributory negligence was no defense and
that the burden was on the defendant to prove that
the negligence, if any, of Wm. Frank Lucus was the
·.sold proximate cause of his death. ·The trial court gave
to the jury instructions which state these issues upon
proximate cause and contributory negligence in the language requested by the defendant. In view of those
instructions the jury must be assumed to have understood the purpose of the rules was upon the issue of
sole proximate cause.
The Supreme Court in Great N otrthern Ry. C.o. v.
Wiles, 60 L. Ed. 732, 240 U. S. 444, held there could be
no recovery for the death of a brakeman on the caboose
of a train which broke in two because the drawbar pulled
out and stopped the train! instantly. Another train following ran into the caboose because the deceased failed
to perform his duty to immediately put out signals to
protect the stopped train as required by rule. The Minnesota court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied
from the pulling out of the drawbar and submitted the
case to the jury on the theory of comparative negligence.
1

''There is no room for the application of
the rule of comparative negligenee established by
the employer's liability act of April 22, 1908,
(35 Stat. at L. 65, Chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1913,
Sec. 8657), vvhere the rear brakeman of a parted
freight train, disregarding his duty to protect the
·rear of his train by going back a short distance
and giving the warning signals which the carrier's rules required, remained in the caboose and
was killed there when a passenger train, which
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he kne,,~ "~a.s closely follo\ving, ran into the standing train, :since hi~ \Yas the causal negligence,
eYen if negligence could be iinputed to the carrier
fron1 the pulling out of the draw·bar which caused
the train to break in t\YO, there being no claim
that the passenger train \Vas negligently run.''
The failure of the dra\vbar in the Wiles case which
permitted the train to break in two and come to an emergency stop was a violation of the Safety Appliance A¢t
just as was involved in the Coray case. The defendant httroduced in evidence the rules of the railroad company
\vhich required the deceased flagman under the circumstances must immediately go back with stop signals to
warn approaching trains. The Supreme Court held that
the violation of the rules was the sole p~roximate cause of
the death of the flagman and that he could not recover.

Helton v. Thompson, 36 N.E. (2d) 267, Appellate
Court of Illinois, 1941. The facts and holding of the
court are reflected in the headnotes.
''Evidence held to establish that brakeman, in
violation of dispatcher's orders and without informing engineer or fireman, caused fireman and
engineer to back train onto short and dangerous
switch track rather than on track intended, causing train to be upset, and hence that brakeman'·s
negligence was the sole and efficient cause of his
death, p·recluding recovery therefor from railroad. Federal Employer's Liability Act. §§1-9,
45 U.S.C.A. §§51-59.
''In actions in state court against interstate
railroad for death of employee, decisions under
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trolling. Federal Employer's Liability Act §§1-9,
45 U.S.C.A. §§51-59.
"Under Federal Employer's Liability Act, if
sole proximate cause of plaintiff '·s injury or death
resulted from his ·own conduct, it bars recovery.
Federal Employer's Liability Act. §§ 1-9, 45 U.S.
C.A. ~§51-59.
''The rule that contributory negligence is no
defense where negligence of injured railroad employee and some other employee combine to cause
injury is inapplicable where injured employee
violated company's orders and thus created a
·dangerous ·situation for which he was solely responsible and for which there was no plausible
explanation. Federal Employers' Liability Act
§§1-9, 45 U. S. C. A. §§51-59.''

In the body of the opinion, the court stated and held:
''The administrator and his counsel argue
that the fireman and engineer were negligent in
not slowing the train down more when Probert
gave the slow signal by means of the lighted fusee,
and in not stopping the train immediately when
the 'washout' or emergency signal was given immediately preceding the accident. While there
may be some dispute as to the facts on this phase
of the case decisions under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, which are controlling in ~ases of
this kind, are consistently to the effect that if
the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury or
death resulted from his own conduct, it bars re..
covery. In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 240
U. S. 444, 36 :S. Ct. 406, 408, 60 L.. Ed. 732, a
drawbar on a freight train came apart, and the
train, while stopped, was hit by a; following passenger train. Wiles was the rear brakeman on
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the freight train, and it \vas his duty when it
stopped to go back and flag, \vhich he failed to
do, staying in the caboose 'vhere he was killed
by the collision. The court denied recovery, saying: ~There is no justification for a co1nparison
of negligences or the ap·portioning of their effect.
* * * ''Tiles kne'v them (the rule.s), and he was
pron1pted to the performance of the duty they
enjoined * * * by signals *· * *. He disregarded
both. * * * He brought death to himself ·and to
the conductor of his train.' In Davis v. Kennedy,
266 U. S. 147, 45 S. Ct. 33, 69 L. Ed. 212, an engineer was killed in· a collision of his train with
another, west of a point known as Shops. The
other train had the right of way, and the crew of
Kennedy's train had instructions never to pass
Shops unless they knew as a fact that the other
train had passed it. Kennedy ran -his train past
and beyond Shops and the collision occurred.
Negligence of the other members of the crew was
alleged but recovery was denied, and Mr. Justice
Holmes, in commenting on the circumstances, said
(266 U. S. at pages 148, 149, 45 S. Ct. at page 33,
69 L. Ed. 212): 'It seems to us a perversion of the
statute (the Employers Liability Act) to allow
his representative to recover for an injury directly due to his failure to act as required on the
ground that possibly it might have been prevented if those in secondary relation to the movement had done more.' In Unadilla Valley R. Co.
v. Caldine, 278 U. S. 139, 49 S. Ct. ·91, 73 L. E~d.
224, a conductor who had printed orders that his
train was to pass the other at Bridgeport, instead of waiting at Bridgeport, directed hi.s train
to p;roceed, resulting; in a collision in which Caldine, the conductor, was killed. Certain facts
showing unusual conduct on the part of other employees were adduced in evidence, but the court
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reversed judgrnent for plaintiff, saying (278 U. S.
at page 142, 49 :S. Ct. at page 91, 73 L. Ed: 224) :
'He cannot hold the Com·pany liable for a disaster
that followed disobedience o£ a rule intended to
prevent it, when the disobedience was broug~t
about and intended to be brought about by his
own acts.'
"It is clear from the recor·d that Probert's
negligence was the primary and in fact the sole
and efficient cause of his death, and under the
consistent rulings of the federal courts, many of
which are cited in defendant's brief, recovery is
barred under the act. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co.
v. Davis, 279 U. S. 34, 49 S. Ct. 210, 73 L. Ed. 601;
Southern Railway Co. v . Gray, 241 U. S. 333, 36
S. Ct. 558, 60 L. Ed. 1030; .Southern Railroad Co.
v. Youngblood, Adm'x, 286 U. S. 313, 52 S. Ct.
518, 76 L. Ed. 1124; FTese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co., 263 U. S. 1, 3, 44 S. Ct. 1, 68 L. Ed. 131. ''
The dispatcher's orders in Helton v. T'hompson are
quite similar to the rules relating to track cars in the
Lucus ca.se. The deceased Probert in the Helton case had
received orders from the dispatcher to throw the switch
and let the freight train back into the east passing track.
Instead of doing this, he threw the switch and attempted
to put the train on to the house track. The accident occurred at four o'clock in the morning, and the fireman
and the engineer were nearly one-third of a mile from
where Probert was stationed. Probert first gave a stop
signal, and then a back signal which the fireman gave
to the engineer who acted upon it, and p·roceeded in
a backward motion. The next was a slow ·signal, and
finally a stop signal was given, followed by an emergency
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signal called '',vashout," 'vhich n1eans stop at once. Probert had been standing on top of the rear car and when
the firen1a.n 'vent back to the rear of the train, he found
this car had tipped over the embankment, and Probert
'vas found dead lying on the ground. It was at this time
that the engineer learne·d for the first time that Probert
had directed the train into the house track, instead of
into the east passing track. There was a judgment on a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff below, which was reversed
on appeal, the court holding that the trial court should
have granted a directed verdict in favor ofi the defendant.
The reasoning applied by appellant in an attemp·t
to show that the trial court committe'd error in permitting
the rules of the company relating to track cars to be
introduced as evidence would lead to some very strange
conclusions. Since the rules are instructions of a superior
to an employee, ap·pellant would apparently take the position that it would be immate;rial to prove that Lucus took
the track car out in ·direct violation of sp·ecific orders.
That again under appellant's theory would merely be
contributory negligence and would have no bearing upon
sole proximate cause. Or presumably if Lynch, who was
riding with Lucus on the track car, had observed the train
after it went into an emergency stop and shouted at
Lucus telling him the train had stopped and imploring
him to stop the track car, and if Lucus had looked at the
stopped train and then failed to ap~ply the brakes, I
·,suppose it 'could be contented that his conduct in refusing to stop the track car even though he observed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

train ahead of him was nothing more than contributory
negligence, and the facts in that regard should not be
admitted in evidence. The illustrations used differ in
degree but not in ·principle from the facts at bar. Under
the law of this case, it was the function of the jury to decide whether under all the facts and circumstances relevant and material to the question of proximate cause,
the negligence of Lucus was the sole proximate cause.
The cases from the :supreme Court of the United States
which have ruled that the con.duct in those cases of the
employee was the sole proximate cause as a matter of
law of the injury or death involved are not overruled
so far as the issue here involved is concerned. The Supreme Court of the United States has not held that the
conduct of Lucus is merely contributory negligence.
All the Supreme Court has held is that the question of
causation is for the jury. The same evidence which
proves the facts, and including the rules of the company
relating to the conduct of the employee, are admissible
and material whether the issue is one of law or one of
fact.
The Supreme Court of Missouri is frequently called
upon to decide cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Hamp'ton v. w.ab~ash R. C.o., 204 S. W. (2d) 708
decided by that court on September 8, 1947, contains a
lucid discussion of the legal principals involved in the
Lucus case. Plaintiff's husban·d was killed by defendant's passenger train. He was in charge of an extra
gang engaged in repairing the track in a deep cut on a
long curve. The banks of the cut were covered with trees.
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The deceased and his nine men w~re working in the cut
about 975 feet fro1n its west end when they 'vere run
do"'"'ll by the defendant's eastbound train going seventyfive miles an hour. He had placed a ''slow board'' at
the side of the track about a mile west of where they were
"~orking. Under the rules, this indica ted that the track
one mile distant from the board was in .condition for a
speed of not more than ten miles an hour except for
first class train.s which did not have to reduce speed.
The train involved in the accident was a first class train.
The train was late. It normally went east through the
cut a little before one o-'eloek.
Under defendant's rules enginemen must sound the
whistle approaching curves, and when the view is restricted by weather or other unusual conditions. There
was evidence that it was the practice to -soun·d the whistle
all the way around curves in cuts for the protection of
men who might be working on the :curve. There was
evidence that the train involved did not sound a warning. Plaintiff charged that the written rules and custom
were violated by defendant.
Defendant's track supervisor had verbally instructed
deceased not to operate the comp·re.ssor unless he had
a watchman on the bank where he could see ap~roximately
two miles. This instruction was violated by deceased,
and defendant contends it was the primary and sole
negligence, and that it was entitled to a directed verdict.
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The court held that the negligence of the deceased
''did not preclude a finding by the jury that his death
was in part due to the negligence of the railroad's servants."
This Hampton ~ase shows the propriety of the admission of the rules. The court held the negligence of
the defendant's servants other than the plaintiff's deceased husband was "a link in an unbroken chain of reasonably foreseeable events.'' Brady v. Southern R. Co.,
/

320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 237, 88 L. Ed. 239. The rules
of the defendant, Southern Pacific Company, in the
Coray case were properly introduced to enable the jury
to determine whether the failure of the triple valve was
a link in an unbroken chain of reasonably foreseeable
events. The question of proximate cause is not eliminated in the case, because a violation of the safety app~liance law is involved.
The court quoted the rule as follows:
''We find in 35 Am. J ur., Master and Servant, :Sec. 407, the doctrine drawn from these
United States Supreme Court cases stated as follows: 'In accord with the well-settled rule that
there can he no recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act where the negligence of
the employee is the sole proximate cause of the
injury, it is very generally held that where a violation of a regulation or instruction promulgated
by the employer is the sole proximate cause of the
injury, there can be no recovery under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.' "
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C. INSTRUCTION NUl\iBER 16 PROPERLY TOLD THE
JURY THAT IF THE SOLE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF
LUCUS WAS HIS OWN CONDUCT THE PLAINTIFF COULD
NOT RECOVER.

Appellant. assigns error because the court gave Instruction No. 16 which is set out at page 210 of the record. The appellant's exception to this instruction is
found at page 145 of the Bill of Exceptions, and follows:
''The plaintiff excepts to instruction number
16 and each and every par- and portion thereof
on the ground and for the reason that under said
instruction the issue of contributory negligence
was in fact submitted to the jury contrary to the
Federal Safety Appliance Act and Federal Employers Liability Act.''
The exception to the instruction is general rather
than specific. It does not point out or sp~ecify the p·art
of the instruction to which objection is made to say that
each and every part is objectionable. It adds nothing to
a general exception to Instruction No. 16 to say that each
and every part is objectionable. The reason for the exception does not sp·ecify the language to which objection is made. It is clearly established that in order for
such an exception to raise any question for review in this
court, the entire instruction must be erroneous. If the
instruction contains sep-arate paragraphs or propositions
which correctly state the law applicable to the case, the
instruction is to be upheld in this court because the exception brings before this court only one question, to wit:
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Was any "part or portion" of the instruction properly
given by the trial court~
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 16 reads :
"The burden is upon defendant to prove from
a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence, if any, of William Frank Lucus was the
sole proximate cause of his death.''
There can be no question upon the correctness of this
part of the inBtruction so that under the rule relating
to general exceptions the assignment of error of appellant on this point must be overruled.
In Shortinoi v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 52 U. 476, 174
P. 860, this court said:
''Counsel for defendant excepted to twenty
of the thirty-five paragraphs. The exception invariably read as follows: 'Defendant excepts to
instruction No. ________ ,' stating the number of the
paragraph excepted to. We have repeatedly held
-indeed, we have so often decided it that it has
become elementary-that unless the entire paragraph is vulnerable such an exception presents
nothing for review. As before stated, each paragraph of the court's charge, with perhaps one or
two exceptions, contained more than one legal proposition. A general exception to the whole paragraph, therefore, may refer to any one of several propositions contained in the paragraph. The
purpose of taking an exception to an instruction
is to direct the trial court's attention to the legal
proposition which it is contended is faulty. The
fault may lie in an omission, or in a \vord, a
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phrase, or sentence, or in several sentences. While
no reason need be assigned for the exception, yet
if an alleged faulty staten1ent of law consists in
a '""ord, phrase, or sentence, or in a series of sentences, the excep1tion should be limited to such
word, p~rase, sentence, or sentences, so that the
trial court may examine them, and, if possible,
c.orrec.t the error. If, therefore, an exception is
to the "'"hole paragraph, it is a matter of mere
conjecture what portion of the same is intended
to be excepted to. Nor does such a general exception present anything to this court for review
unless the "~hole paragraph excepted to is faulty,
which is .seldom the case. In view, therefore, of
the general nature of the exceptions, we cannot
review the many errors assigned relating to the
instructions.''
In Ryan v. Beaver Cournty, 82 U. 27, 21 P. (2d) 858,
the court quotes with approval from the earlie·r Utah
case of Farnsw-o.rth v. Union Facific Goal Co., 32 U. 112,
89 P. 74, as follows :
'' 'It is no longer an open question in this
court, as it has often been held in common with
most courts, that in taking exceptions the portion
that is. exc.epted to must be p10inted out. A mere
exception to an instruction is an exception in
solido to the whole instruction, and, unless the
whole instruction is bad, the exception is unavailing for the purp·ose of having any particular part
reviewe·d an·d passed upon by this court.' ''
There was no prejudicial error in Instruction No.
16. It told the jury that if the negligence of Lucus was
the sole proximate cause of his death, then the verdict
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

must be for defendent no cause of action. The instruc'
tion eontains three sentences.
The first told the jury
that where an employee has two ways of performing an
act, the one safe and the other dangerous, he owes a
duty to pursue the safe method, and -any departure will
prevent recovery if he is injured. The next two sentences told the jury that such conduct prevented recovery if it was the sole proximate cause, and that the
burden of ·proof on the question of sole proximate cause
was on the defendant. As pointed out elsewhere in this
brief, the jury had been told that contributory negligence was no defense, and that the defendant was guilty
of a violation of the S-afety Appliance Act, and that if
such violation proximately caused in whole or in part
the death of Lucus, the verdict should be in favor of the
plaintiff. Assuming, as we must on this appeal, that the
jury construed the instructions together as an integrated
whole, they could not have been misled by anything
stated in No. 16.
In Comeooe:s v. R.ailroad Co., 37. U. 475, 109 P. 10,
this court held :
''It will thus be observed that the court, while
,
it did not charge the jury on the question of contributory negligence in the instruction complained
of, nevertheless did give other instructions in
which it carefully guarded the rights of the defendant, so far .as they were involved in that issue.
It is a familiar rule of law that all the instructions
must be read and considered together and if as a
' of the' law
whole, they contain a correct statement
applicable to the issues in a case, the court canSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not be convieted of error because the la\v applicable to the different questions involved is separately stated. In such case the instructions supplement each other, and if, 'vhen read and considered
as a series theY contain a correct statement of the
la\Y, it is suffic&ient.''
•

POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
REGARDING THE 1\IEASURE OF DAMAGES.

Appellant states on page 40 of his brief:
''The evidence :presented on the dependency
and reasonable expectation of Mrs. Lucus for
support from Frank Lucus demonstrated beyond
any possible doubt that Frank Lucus did not at
the time of his death intend to voluntarily support Mrs. Lucus. Reference to defendant's Exhibit '2' will demonstrate that Mrs. Lucus did
not believe that she could voluntarily get support
from Frank Lucus. However, Mrs. Lucus had an
adjudication of her right to support from Frank
Lucus and that adjudication by the California
Court continued in force to the date of Frank
Lucus' death. * * * ''
Apparently, appellant agrees with defendant that the expectation or right to be supported had become dissolved
or had been replaced by a court judgment. The voluntary
basis had disapp~eared. The statement that ,"Frank
Lucus did not at the time of his ·death intend to voluntarily support Mrs. Lucus'' is fully concurred in by
appellee. We would go further and assert that the testiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38
mony would support a finding by the jury that Frank
Lucus did not intend to pay Mrs. Lucus any of the $10.00
a week ordered by the court as support money. He left
Los Angeles for western Utah a short time after this
order was signed by the court, on January 6, 1943. He
was killed on May 24, 1944. He did not write or communicate with Mrs. Lucus in -that interval of time. (Tr. 8889) She exhausted all the means at her command to
learn where he was without success. The jury could find
that he did not intend to pay her any money after January 6, 1943, but also that he was determined that her
efforts if any to force him legally to pay her support
II

•

money should not succeed. In her cross complaint for
separate maintenance filed in the Superior Court for
Los Angeles County, she had alle_ged:
''V. That, although defendant has been a
good and loving wife to the plaintiff, plaintiff
has been guilty of extreme cruelty in his treatment of defendant, causing her great mental pain,
suffering and anguish.
''VI. That plaintiff deserted and abandoned
defendant more than a year prior to the commencement of his action and lived separate and
apart from the defendant against the will and
wishes of the defendant; that during all of said
time said plaintiff did not contribute anything
· to the support of defendant and did not supply
her with the necessities of life; that during the
entire n1arried life of the parties the defendant
has been forced to work to earn her livelihood
and necessities of life; that plaintiff has always
earned more than enough money to support deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fendant but has failed, neglected and refused
so to do; all of \Yhich has been due to no fault of
the defendant.''
,.,..... That plaintiff squanders his money on
liquor, in bars and on friends and acquaintances
\vith who1n he associates with at public drinking
places, constantly drinking to excess.
· '\~. That defendant has pleaded and
begged plaintiff to give up his disreputable
friends, to cease patronizing public bars and to
return home and live with defendant; that plaintiff has persistently refused to do so; that due
to his excessive drinking, plaintiff has become,
in the past, involved in several grievous difficulties, from which defendant was able to extricate him only after great and costly effort; that
due to plaintiff's conduct, defendant worries about
him and is in constant ·dread that he will again
become involved in difficulties ; that her worry
has been so great that it has affected her health
and she cannot sleep or rest properly, has lost
her appetite and is almost physically exhausted;
that she is in need of medical attention and cannot afford to pay for it; that she.fears that she
may have to quit her job because of her health;
that unless she receive financial aid from plaintiff
she will suffer to a great extent."
She made "every effort possible" to get in touch
with him after January 6, 1943, which was the day they
had the hearing before the Judge, and she was granted
$10.00 a week commencing February 1, 1943.
Plaintiff's request No. 11 is not a correct statement
of any legal principJe which would furnish a guide for
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the jury. The first sentence told them the marriage relation creates a right on the part of the wife to be supported by her husband, and this right may be legally
enforced by her so long as the marriage relation exists.
Mrs. Lucus at the time of trial or at any other time since
January 6, 1943, did not have the right to be supported
by her husband. That right had been merged into a decree in a divorce proceeding allowing her $10.00 a week
until the further order of the court. The statement above
might be proper in the normal relation of husband and
wife living together if the husband is able to earn enough
to support the wife and the wife is dependent. But the
trial court very properly refused to instruct the jury
that Mrs. Lucus had the right to ''support.'' Her ''right''
was limited to $10.00 a week.
The second clause told the jury that if Edith B.
Lucus is entitled to recover damages she can not he deprived of that right by a plea on the part of defendant
that her husband had not fulfilled the duties he owed to
her. This instruction if given would have led the jury to
set up some standard of support which Lucus should
have furnished his wife and based their verdict for
damages on that standard without regard to whether
Lucus had actually supported Mrs. Lucus. The request
told the jury in effect that they should disregard the evidence in the record that Lucus had ''failed'' and '' refused'' to support Mrs. Lucus during the entire married
life of the parties. This uncontradicted record of nonsupport should be ignored, and they should ba.se their
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Yerdict upon the '~duty'' of the husband to ''support.''
The instruction told the jury to disregard the evidence
of past perforn1ance a.nd require the defendant to fulfill the duty of support 'Yhich Lucus did not discharge
during his life. If the request means anything, that is
'vhat it means.
This request No. 11 is in conflict \vith appellant's
request No. 10. Request No. 10 'Yas given as instruction
No. 11 as requested. In it the jury was pro·perly instructed that the measure of damages was ''the lo-ss ·of
perm,niary benefits which she might reasonably have expected to receive from the s·aid deceased during her lifeti·n1-e if the said deceased had not been killed.'' And in
another paragraph of the same instruction requested hy
appellant, the measure is stated as ''the present cash
value of the estimated future contributions toward her
support which she could reasonably have expected from
the deceased during her lifetime had he not been killed.''
Reasonable expectation of future p~ecuniary support
or contributions is entirely different from telling the
jury to decide what the deceased owed as a duty and
then disregard his past record of non-support and give
a verdict imposing the non..:performed duty of Lucus
on the Southern Pacific Company.
Appellant's request No. 11 told the jury that in
determining the loss of pecuniary benefits, they may take
into consideration not only such voluntary contributions
as Lucus may reasonably have been expected to make,
but also such contributions as she may reasonably have
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been expected to secure through the enforcement of her
legal right to support from the husband.
In vie·w of the fact that Instruction No. 10 spoke of
"pecuniary benefits" and "estimated future contributions" it included in its general terms both "voluntary"
and ''involuntary'' contributions. Instruction No. 10
covered the field fully and correctly.
There was no evidence in the record from which
the jury could find specifically that Mrs. Lucus would
obtain "involuntary" contributions from Lucus through
the enforcement of her legal right to support. Her right
to ''support'' had been exchanged by court order for
$10.00 a week. She exhausted her means of learning
where he was shortly after January 6, 1943, when he left
Los Angeles. :She never heard from him after that date.
She discontinued her ·search. A finding she would have
located him and forced him to support her would have
_been contrary to all the evidence in the record on the
point. Mrs. Lucus did not testify she had any intention
of prutting the law on Lucus and forcing him to pay her
the $10.00 a week. At page 88 of the transcript, she
said she made every effort possible to get in touch with
her husband. She was very much distressed. ''I didn't
know where he was and was worried about him.'' She
inquired at the draft board, and the navy recruiting office
and his former employer, and wrote to him at his
mother's home, but the letter came back. She thought
eventually her husband would return to her. She maintained the home and thought if he had been alive he
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"·ould be there \Yith her today. She "ras positive he
\Yould return to her son1e day.
If this testimony is entitled to_ any weight, it proves
she 'was not going to enforce her legal rights to $10.00
a week, but she was going to maintain the home with
full assurance he would return some day (before trial)
and voluntarily resume the marriage relation and voluntarily contribute. While the testimony on this question on
involuntary contributions is very meager, it proves Mrs.
Lucas had no intention of forcing Lucus to pay. She is
the only person who knew her own mind, and the record
shows it was her intention to rest on her ''positive"
conviction he would return to live with her.
Appellant objects to Instruction No. 9, which provided:
'' 'You are instructed that the mere fact that
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank, Lucus
at the time of his death is not sufficient evidence
to prove that plaintiff is entitled to recover any
damages for his death in this action. If you believe from all the evidence in the case, that the
deceased would not have made any further money
contributions to Edith Lucus or would not have
supported her in the future if he had not died,
then your verdict should he for the defendant.' "
This instruction was just the converse of Instruction
No. 11 that the measure of damages was the reasonable
expectation of future contributions. It follows as a logical and necessary corollary from the rule of damages
in appellant's request No. 10 given as Instruction No. 11.
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Appellant does not refer us to any law, which holds that
the mere fact that Edith Lucus was the legal wife of
Frank Lucus entitled plaintiff to recover damages for
his death. Neither are we referred to any law which
holds that it was error to instruct the jury that if they
believed the deceased would not have made any further
money contributions to Mrs. Lucus if he lived, their
verdict should be for the defendant. The cases cited by
appellant hold that defendant is not entitled to a directed
verdict on the question of damages where a wife or a
wife and minor child are plaintiffs even though there
was a failure of support prior to death. But it is unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff below made
a jury issue upon damages. The issue of damages was
submitted to the jury under the instruction drawn and
requested by appellant that the measure of damage was
the present cash value of estimated future contributions toward her support which she could have reasonably expected from the deceased had he not been killed.
This includes all contributions, voluntary and involuntary.
Ap·pellant relies upon Gilliam v. Southern Ry. Co.,
93 S.E. 865 (So. Carolina, 1917). We believe that case
is authority supportin_g the refusal of the trial court in
the Coray case to give the plaintiff's requested instruction on involuntary contributions. Plaintiff had judgment
below for the death of Whit McBride who left a wife and
minor child. He married the woman sixteen or eighteen
years before, and after living with her about a year he
abandoned her and his child. There was no evidence
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that he after"~ards contributed anything to the support
of either of then1, nor \Yas there any evidence that he
did not. There was evidence that after he abandoned her,
his wife lived in the house with another man and that she
had another child. The defendant moved for a directed
verdict which was denied and there was a verdict for
plaintiff, and an appeal by defendant. _The court held
that the motion for directed verdict on the ground that
the woman and child sustained no actual pe:cuniary loss
by the death of McBride was properly denied, because
prima facie and presumptively the widow and minor
unmarried child of deceased had a legal pecuniary interest in the continuance of his life. The portion of the opinion quoted in appellant's brief holds that th~ defendant
in the Coray case was not entitled. to a directed verdict
on the question of damages. Since the is-sue of damages
was submitted to the jury, we submit that the quotation,
while interesting and instructive is beside any real issue
in this case. But note the following language of the case:
"It follows, however, that, although the technical right may exist, yet the deprivation of it
may .cause very little, or, possibly, no actual financial loss, for it may be shown from the relation,
circumstances, and relative condition of deceased
and the surviving relatives for whose benefit the
action is brought that ~no actual pecuniary los·s,
present or prospective, resulted to them from his
death; and it is well settled that it is only for such
loss that recovery may he had. Michigan Central
R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 5'9, 33 Sup. Ct. 192,
57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176 ; American
R. Co. v. Didrickson, 227 U. S. 145, 33 Sup. Ct.
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224, 57 L. Ed. 456; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. McGinnis,
228 U. S. 173, 33 Sup. Ct. 426, 57 L. Ed. 785 .; St.
Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35
Sup. Ct. 704, 59 L. Ed. 1160, or as in the McGinnis
case, it may appear that some of them sustained
such loss while others did not. Therefore, in view
of the evidence tending to show that the wife had
forfeited her right of support, the court should
have _given defendant's first request, to wit.~
'I charge you the measure of damages
is the amount which will compensate the surviving beneficiaries for the actual pecuniary
loss, and the jury should apportion the
amount among them according to the loss
of each.'
''In this connection, we consider the assignment of error in charging plaintiff's fourth request, to wit:
'That the law of this state imposes upon
a man the duty of supporting his wife and
children, and in the absence of other proof
it will be presumed that-everybody obeys the
law of the land until the contrary appears.'
''While that is a sound p-roposition of law,
and is applicable when there is no evidence upon
the question _whether the duty has been performed, or when the evidence upon that issue is
conflicting, yet, in view of the undisputed evidence in this case that deceased had not supported
his wife and child, this instruction might have
been misleading, for the jury might have understood it as -authorizing an award of damages for
the loss -of sup:port, presumed to have been furnished, when, in fact, it had not been furnished.
Under the evidence, recovery, if at all should
have been limited to the prospective lo~s which
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the "~ido'v and daughter actually sustained by
reason of the deprivation of their right of support as heretofore explained.''
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff had a fair trial and the jury returned a
verdict of no cause of action. Th·e verdict is supported
by the testimony in the record on the gro11nd that the
failure of the air line and the stop·ping of the train was
not the proximate cause of the death of Lucus. The verdict also finds support in the testimony that Mrs. Lucus
sustained no pecuniary loss when Mr. Lucus was killed.
Reading all the instructions together, the jury was p·roperly instructed and there was no error in the admis-·
. sion of testimony.
The judgment below upon the verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendamt and

Respondent.
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